Mao moves to eliminate opposition to land reform among Jiangxi Communists.
Further reading and listening:
Stuart Schram, ed., Mao’s Road to Power, vol. 3: From the Jinggangshan to the Establishment of the Jiangxi Soviets, July 1927-December 1930
Pang Xianzhi and Jin Chongji, Mao Zedong: A Biography, vol. 1: 1893-1949
Mao Zedong nianpu, 1893-1937 (毛泽东年谱)
Li Qingzhao, “Like a Dream”
Philip Huang, et al., Chinese Communists and Rural Society, 1927-1934
Joseph Fewsmith, Forging Leninism in China: Mao and the Remaking of the Chinese Communist Party, 1927–1934
Stephen Averill, “The Origins of the Futian Incident”
Stephen Averill, “Party, Society, and Local Elite in the Jiangxi Communist Movement”
Michael Dutton, Policing Chinese Politics
Textum Dergi special issue on China
Some names from this episode:
Li Qingzhao, Song Dynasty poet (1084-1155)
Guo Huaruo, Communist military theoretician
Xiao Ke, Red Army commander
Peng Pai, Communist peasant organizer
Chen Duxiu, Communist leader during the period of the first united front with the Guomindang
Mikhail Borodin, Comintern agent and political head of Soviet mission to aid the Guomindang
Peng Dehuai, commander of the 5th Red Army
Huang Gonglüe, commander of the 6th Red Army
Zeng Shan, party secretary of Yanfu district, close ally of Mao
Episode artwork:
The room where the February 7 Meeting was held
Listen now:
Transcript:
Welcome to episode 138 of the People’s History of Ideas Podcast.
Two episodes ago, among other things, we discussed how in January 1930 Mao Zedong and Zhu De lured the suppression force that had been sent to crush the Communist insurgency away from western Fujian and into Jiangxi, and then circled around and defeated the counter-revolutionaries. This was a classic application of their sixteen-character formula for waging guerrilla warfare: “The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue.” This episode, we’ll pick up where we left off, following up on the Communist victory in Jiangxi.
This victory had essentially handed the Communists control over several counties in southern and western Jiangxi. To commemorate the recent military success, and also inspired by the start of the lunar new year on January 30, Mao wrote a poem meant to capture the scene as the Red Army troops marched from Western Fujian into Southern Jiangxi.
It was titled “New Year’s Day” and it went like this:
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This poem, and others that Mao wrote, were meant to be chanted or sung to a specific well-known tune, but I can’t do that. This poem was set to the tune of the Song Dynasty poet Li Qingzhao’s poem “Like a Dream,” which was about a drunken, joyous excursion in the poet’s youth when she accidentally got her boat lost in a field of lotus flowers. I found a musical rendition of Li Qingzhao’s poem online, so I’ve included a link to that in the show notes, so that you can have some idea of the poem’s tune.
In the respite from hard fighting that followed the victory, the Red Army dispersed its forces into order to spread across the countryside and conduct political work among the masses. In his memoirs, the Fujianese communist Guo Huaruo, who later became one of the Communists’ leading military thinkers during the Yan’an period (and going forward from there), described how Mao would conduct himself during these periods of dispersal for political work (as opposed to the times when Mao and the army were fully consumed by immediate military threats):
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So there was this kind of in-breath and out-breath rhythm to the Communist Party’s work in the Fourth Red Army, alternating between periods of intense military engagement and periods of social investigation and political work meant to win over the masses (mainly peasants) to the revolution and organizing the peasants to carry out land reform and do things like form militia units or to support the revolution in other ways like by forming local soviet governments.
As much of Jiangxi was suddenly opened up to the Red Army and the Communists dispersed to rally the masses to the revolutionary banner, they had determined that the main focus of their efforts to mobilize the peasantry would be land reform. Yet, as they carried out initial social investigations in order to make this happen, they quickly realized that there was a significant obstacle within their own ranks which would have to be dealt with if the land reform (and the formation of local revolutionary base areas which land reform was a vehicle for accomplishing) was going to happen.
To understand the opposition to carrying out a thoroughgoing land reform which arose within the ranks of the Communist Party in Jiangxi, it will be helpful to revisit some features of how the Communist Party had developed in Jiangxi province which we have talked about before. All the way back in episode number 66, when we were talking about the early revolutionary movement in the Jinggangshan, the movement that predated Mao’s arrival in the area after the defeat of the Autumn Harvest Uprisings, we talked about how a section of the local elites had been attracted to Communism. Like many other revolutionaries in China at the time, these local elites viewed the experience of the Soviet Union as representing an attractive potential path for modernizing China. And in episodes 109 and 110, when we were talking about the Donggu base area, we discussed how the leaders of the base area were drawn from this pro-Communist section of the local elites.
The leading Communists in the area were mainly local educated youth who had returned to their home area to carry out revolution. They were for the most part from better off families (almost by definition this was the case for educated youth). In Donggu in particular, they leaned on their elite status in mobilizing peasants, in some ways reproducing the patron-client relations between landlords and peasants even as they mobilized peasants to reform local social relations and fight against the most exploitative of the local landlords. You might remember that Xiao Ke, one of the Fourth Red Army commanders, observed that the Donggu leaders had dressed in long cotton robes, and that in his words they dressed “like gentry, not like soldiers.”
Although we’ve discussed it before, it bears repeating that it was common for Communists to have been radicalized during their student years, and students tended to have better off class backgrounds. Mao himself, after all, was a rich peasant. And the pioneer of Communist peasant organizing, Peng Pai, as we discussed back in episode 37, was the son of a landlord who was radicalized while studying in Japan and then, when he returned to China, also leveraged his local influence to organize the peasants in his home territory.
So, on the one hand, there was nothing particularly unusual or new about the Communist leadership in Donggu and nearby areas of Jiangxi being largely drawn from among the more privileged strata of local society. But unlike Mao and other communists from relatively better-off sections of the peasantry, they had organized a base area in the place that they were from. While Mao’s authority relied both on his status as a leading Communist and, most immediately, as the leader of a large armed force, the authority of much of the local Communist leadership in areas such as Donggu and nearby Yanfu still rested in large part on their status as educated members of the local leading families. This meant that carrying out a land reform which included better off local peasants, and not just focusing on the most exploitative landlords, would undermine these local Communist leaders’ own base of support in the community.
Now, you may be wondering, why would these local elites have joined the Communist Party to begin with? Didn’t they know what they were getting into? And the answer to this question is that the whole meaning of the Communist revolution was fluid, and subject to contestation between the various people taking up the banner of Communism. For the local Jiangxi elites who became Communists, as we discussed back in episodes 66 and 67, the Communist Party had seemed an appropriate vehicle for carrying out struggle against other, less progressive elite groups. The example of Soviet-style industrialization and modernization did not, to these provincial elites, seem to necessarily imply the total loss of their own personal, local power. There was nothing in the policies put forward by Chen Duxiu and Mikhail Borodin during the period of the United Front with the Guomindang that these people could not live with, and much that they supported. And for a brief period before the Guomindang turned on the Communists, some Communists wielded local political power in Jiangxi as part of the united front government (again, as we discussed back in episodes 66 and 67).
Mao Zedong had already tried to carry out a land reform in some of these areas when the Fourth Red Army passed through them in the spring of 1929. You might remember that back in episode 116, we discussed the Xingguo Land Law, which the Communists passed when they occupied Xingguo and some neighboring countries in southern Jiangxi before moving into western Fujian. This initial effort at carrying out a land reform in southern Jiangxi, however, was stymied by the opposition of local Communist leaders. After the Fourth Red Army left Xingguo, these local Communist Party leaders went so far as to mobilize peasants to put up slogans denouncing Mao Zedong and Zhu De.
Now, in January 1930, this opposition within the Communist Party to carrying out a full scale land reform was perceived by Mao Zedong and Zhu De as the primary obstacle to consolidating the Red Army’s recent victory by establishing red political power across several counties in southern Jiangxi. To deal with this opposition, a meeting was quickly called.
This meeting was a joint conference of the Front Committee of the 4th Red Army, along with the Western Jiangxi Special Committee and the army committees of the 5th and 6th red armies. The Southern Jiangxi Special Committee would have sent representatives as well, but they couldn’t get there in time. Which gives you a sense of the urgency of the issues motivating this conference. Actually, the 5th red army was also not really able to send anyone, but gets counted as represented at the meeting because Peng Dehuai, the leader of the 5th army, asked his old friend, Huang Gonglue, of the 6th army, to represent the 5th army also at the conference. The conference took place in the village of Pitou, near Donggu, which was where the West Jiangxi Special Committee was currently headquartered, after having tried to operate clandestinely in the city of Ji’an and ending up having a bunch of its members arrested.
So, about 50 people took part in this meeting from February 6 to 9. I want to add one little caveat to these dates. Almost all sources have February 6 to 9 as the dates. However, the semi-official biography of Mao which was put together by a team led by Pang Xianzhi and Jin Chongji, a team working with materials that aren’t available to most researchers, gives the dates as February 2 to 9. So, this might be a typo, or it might be that they are including some meetings that occurred in preparation for the rest of the conference as part of the conference. I wouldn’t bother mentioning it, but when an authoritative source like Pang and Jin’s biography of Mao differs from other sources, it often means that there is something there to investigate, and so I can easily lose a day or two trying to just figure out what is at the bottom of the discrepancy. This has sometimes been very fruitful, but in this case it hasn’t been so far. Anyways, just a small caveat there on the dates. It’s also worth mentioning that two key documents that come out of the conference that we will be discussing later are dated February 14 and 16. So even though the conference ended on February 9, the leadership coming out of the conference continued meeting and issuing documents and guidance related to how the party was moving forward for a good week afterwards.
OK, one last note about the conference and when it took place, is that it is often referred to as the ‘February 7 Conference,’ because of the important land reform law that it approved on February 7.
OK, now, if you look at the episode artwork, you can see a picture of the room where the conference took place. How 50 people fit in there, I don’t know. Certainly, they weren’t all seated around that table. But I think it’s safe to say it was a pretty crowded room.
So, before we start going into the documents and analyzing what was going on in our next episode or two, let’s summarize what the conference was about. Basically, what happens at this conference is Mao gets all of the Communist organizations together from Jiangxi that he can quickly pull together and he says, we have this great opportunity here to grow the revolution and maybe even take the whole province. What we need to do to make this happen is to quickly establish Soviet power across the countryside. To do this, we need to make carrying out land reform the key link in our work, and to do that, we need to reorganize our forces by making the Front Committee of the Fourth Army the Front Committee for everybody. A big part of needing to reorganize things is because there are all these other Communists who came out of the local elites who are obstructing land reform, and we need to get them out of the way. To fix this, basically, Mao says that he should be in charge of all the Communist work in Jiangxi now, and the conference approves this over the opposition of the people who have been opposing a thoroughgoing land reform. Formally, what happens is that the Front Committee of the 4th Army becomes the Front Committee for everywhere that the 4th, 5th, and 6th red armies are functioning, and also it gets put in charge of the West and South Jiangxi Special Committees, which are merged into a new Southwest Jiangxi Special Committee. (You might be wondering if there was a regular, not special, Jiangxi Province Committee. But there wasn’t a functioning one at this time, because of arrests and general repression.) So basically, the people who have been opposing land reform are made subordinate to people who are going to make sure that it is being carried out.
Mao’s opponents are going to say that this conference didn’t have the authority to do this, but we’ll talk about that later on.
Now, all of this land reform and reorganization of the party under Mao’s leadership are not just for their own sake, they are for the purpose of moving directly toward conquering more territory. And, the conference does come up with a very optimistic outlook for taking the whole province of Jiangxi in the near future, with the next concrete step being to take the city of Ji’an. It’s easy to fixate on certain themes from this conference like ‘Mao consolidating organizational power in his own hands,’ or, more understandably in my opinion, to think of Mao’s goal here as carrying out land reform. But actually, to understand what Mao was about, I think we have to always remember that consolidating organization under his own command, and carrying out land reform are for Mao methods of moving toward a larger revolution (even if, for example, land reform is understood as a revolutionary aim which expresses values that are in line with the overall revolutionary goal). Especially before liberation, in the middle of the armed struggle, land reform is conceived as a way of mobilizing people for revolution, not as an aim in itself (even if the way in which it is carried out is supposed to be done in a way that reflects the egalitarian aims of the whole revolutionary project, prefiguring the larger goals of the communist revolution). So, as we’ll see in a second here when I read you the slogans coming out of the conference, a big focus coming out of the conference is moving on quickly with the next step in conquering China for communism, which they decided was to take Ji’an.
So, since we’re wrapping up here and will get to these documents in future episodes, I’ll give you the language that concretely expressed what Mao wanted to communicate about the importance of this conference to the masses of people in Jiangxi. Here are the six slogans that came out of the conference:
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Just one other thing about the February 7 Conference is that the conference ends with the execution of four Communist leaders from the village of Yanfu. This is the first time, as far as I can tell, that a conference ended with the execution of Communist cadres. This is a notable turning point that shouldn’t go unremarked. What we know about these four executed cadres was that at least two of them (and probably all four) had founded the base area in Yanfu; that they were all from rich peasant backgrounds; and all exemplified the localist orientation that Mao was trying to change. A close ally of Mao’s, Zeng Shan, had been sent to serve as party secretary in Yanfu district, and these four leaders had blocked his efforts to carry out land reform and to integrate their local guerrilla force into the 6th Red Army. The area faced regular military pressure from the enemy, and they were concerned about losing control of the local armed forces and not being able to defend their territory. They also argued that party members should not have their own lands confiscated. During their conflict over these issues with Zeng Shan and members of the party branch who did want to obey the central directives to carry out land reform and merge the local armed force into the 6th Red Army, they formed a guerrilla that was personally loyal to themselves and recruited local rowdies into the party in order to harass the local party branch members who opposed them. They had also been in touch with other locally oriented Communist cadres who met with them about resisting the line coming down from Mao. Their execution at the conclusion of the conference was meant to send a message. They were symbolic representatives of a larger group that shared similar attitudes. Mao was serving notice to the local elites who had joined the revolution because they saw the Communist Party as a vehicle for consolidating their own local power.
OK, just a couple notes before I end this.
First off, my next book, Communism in World History, is nearly done. The manuscript is due at Routledge at the end of January and it looks right now like I will have it done on time. (Fingers crossed.) Thanks to everyone who has been supportive and understanding. I know that the podcast has really suffered for my attention having been diverted to the textbook, and I hope that in the end it will have been worthwhile.
Also, for all of you who read Turkish or like to read things online that your web browser translates from Turkish for you, at the end of July the online journal Textum Dergi published a special issue on China. It includes a translation of my article “The Road Is Tortuous: The Chinese Revolution and the End of the Global Sixties,” which I’m pretty stoked about. But perhaps more relevant for you, there are a bunch of other articles there worth reading. I particularly enjoyed the long interview with Fred Engst which they titled “Maoism’s goal is to win the revolution.” And they also translated the very important old article from the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars by Peer Moller Christensen and Jorgen Delman, “A Theory of Transitional Society: Mao Zedong and the Shanghai School,” into Turkish. There are a bunch of other articles in the issue as well that are worth reading. I think that my article, together with the Fred Engst interview and the Christensen and Delman article, make a good contrast with some pieces that more take the position that China’s current economic development is, in and of itself, without the more communistic accoutrements of the Mao years, somehow a force for the liberation of the global south. Read it all and make up your own mind. I have to say that I think the automatic translation that Chrome does for webpages has come a long way in the past couple years, so don’t be intimidated if you don’t read Turkish.
OK, that’s it for now. Talk to you again soon. Until then, be well.
